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SNAPSHOT REPORT 2 








• This Snapshot Report incorporates OMDDAC’s findings from interviews with key stakeholders,1 
together with published research, to capture the experiences and lessons learned throughout the 
pandemic in relation to technology-driven approaches to public health. This Report examines 
three case studies: digital proximity and exposure notification; risk scoring algorithms; and Covid-
status certification. 
• Our research has found that a small number of stakeholders believe a centralised NHS Covid-19 
app would have had a positive impact on public health and that the decentralised app has failed 
to produce significant benefits. However, it is unclear what checks and balances would have been 
in place to protect privacy and avoid adverse consequences with a centralised version of the app.  
• There remain major concerns regarding the deployment of a Covid-status certification scheme. 
These include the potential use of certification as a discriminatory tool and associated cyber 
security risks. More fundamentally, the long-term value of the certificate is uncertain given the 
speed of the vaccine rollout. 
• Risk scoring algorithms, whilst useful for helping to protect the most vulnerable in society, require 























1 Interviews have been conducted with key stakeholders across a range of backgrounds and disciplines, including: data organisations, 
government, regulators, law enforcement, the medical profession, the legal profession, charities and the third sector, the private sector and an 
inter-disciplinary range of academics. 
HEADLINE RECOMMENDATIONS  
• The Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC) should develop an oversight 
mechanism to ensure the Covid-status certification is not being applied in a discriminatory 
way.  
• DHSC should review the potential discrimination in the development and deployment 
of tech-based tools to manage the pandemic. Lessons learned from this review should feed 
into any future development of such tools. 
• Algorithmic risk scoring has been used during the pandemic to enable triaging and 
prioritisation decisions to occur at speed. Questions remain however over the 
consequences of errors and the extent to which algorithmic-informed decision-making is 





CASE STUDY 1  







• According to a small number of stakeholders, the decentralised model of the NHS Covid-19 app has 
had little effect on public health due to a lack of data collection which could have been used to 
inform public health decision making. 
• Attention should be paid to a longer-term evaluation of the consequences of a decentralised approach 
on public health aims, and the safeguards and governance frameworks that would be needed to 
generate trust in a centralised model. 
• The rates of download of the NHS Covid-19 app differ between communities and ethnic groups. 
This prompts significant questions with regard to the efficacy of the app, particularly in relation to 
communities at greater risk of contracting Covid-19. 
CASE STUDY OVERVIEW 
This case study examines the use of smartphone applications to facilitate exposure or proximity 
notifications. Specifically, this case study focuses on the NHS Covid-19 app released in England and 
Wales. Figure 1 sets out the timeline of the development and release of the contact tracing app and 





AIMS, OBJECTIVES & BENEFITS 
The purpose of the digital proximity app is to identify and notify people who have been in close contact 
with someone who has contracted Covid-19, to reduce further transmission by requesting them to 
self-isolate. Through targeted communications with people who may have been exposed to the virus, 
epidemics could theoretically be contained without the need for mass quarantines or nationwide 
lockdowns. 
Contact tracing applications, by design, present potential risks to privacy and medical confidentiality 
(as explored below). Design choices to mitigate these risks are therefore vital to ensure that a 
sufficient propoertion of the population trust, install, and use the app effectively. For the purposes of 
this report, the app will be referred to as a ‘digital exposure’ app. This is because the app does not 
trace individual contacts, rather it notifies individuals through push notifications without revealing their 
personal data to a central body. The app has reportedly prevented thousands of deaths in a significant 
endorsement for digital proximity and exposure notification apps.2 
Centralised Model  
Early in the development of the NHS Covid-19 app, the UK pursued a model in which all data would 
be stored in a centralised NHS database.3 The data included de-anonymised identifiers of people 
infected with Covid-19 and the identifiers of all those with whom an infected person had been in 
contact. This information could allow an actor to reconstruct the “social graph” of who an individual 
 
2 BBC News, ‘NHS tracing app ‘prevented thousands of deaths’’, 13 May 2021. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-
57102664 
3 Digital Health, ‘NHSX differs with Apple and Google over contact-tracing app’, 30 April 2020. Available at: 
https://www.digitalhealth.net/2020/04/nhsx-differs-with-apple-and-google-over-contact-tracing-app/ 
References to Figure 1 
1 L. Ferretti et.al, ‘Quantifying SARS-CoV-2 transmission suggests epidemic control with digital contact tracing.’ 
Available at: https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.03.08.20032946v2 
2 Department of Health and Social Care, ‘Health and Social Care Secretary's statement on coronavirus (COVID-19): 12 
April 2020’, 30 April 2020. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/health-and-social-care-
secretarys-statement-on-coronavirus-covid-19-12-april-2020 
3 Andrea Downey, ‘Covid-19: NHS contact-tracing app launched in Isle of Wight’, Digital Health, 4 May 2020. Available 
at: https://www.digitalhealth.net/2020/05/covid-19-nhs-contact-tracing-app-launched-in-isle-of-wight 
4 James Gallagher, ‘Coronavirus: Test and trace system will start on Thursday’, BBC News, 27 May 2020. Available at: 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-52820592 
5 Andrea Downey, ‘Government abandons contact-tracing app for Apple and Google’s tech’, Digital Health, 18 June 
2020. Available at: https://www.digitalhealth.net/2020/06/government-abandons-contact-tracing-app-for-apple-
and-googles-tech/ 
6 HSC Covid-19 NI. See: https://covid-19.hscni.net/stopcovid-ni-faqs/ 
7 BBC News, ‘Scotland's Covid contact tracing app downloaded more than 600,000 times’, 11 September 2020. 
Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-54098960 
8 NHS Oxford University Hospitals, ‘NHS Covid-19 App Is Launched’, 24 September 2020. Available at: 
https://www.ouh.nhs.uk/covid-19/news/article.aspx?id=1379 
9 Department of Health and Social Care, ‘NHS COVID-19 app alerts 1.7 million contacts to stop spread of COVID-19’, 





had been in physical contact with over time, and risked leading to a disproportionate level of 
surveillance. Concerns about the centralised model were voiced in a joint statement signed by over 
150 academics at UK universities.4  
Decentralised Model  
Following backlash against this approach, it was abandoned by the Government in favour of a 
decentralised model which stores proximity data and checks for exposure events on users’ devices.5 
This decentralised approach was developed by Apple and Google. They explain how it works in the 
following terms: ‘users’ devices will regularly send out a beacon via Bluetooth that includes a random 
Bluetooth identifier - a string of random numbers that aren’t tied to a user's identity and change every 
10-20 minutes for additional protection. Other phones will be listening for these beacons and 
broadcasting their own as well. At least once per day, the system will download a list of the keys for 
the beacons that have been verified as belonging to people confirmed as positive for COVID-19. Each 
device will check the list of beacons it has recorded against the list downloaded from the server. If 
there is a match between the beacons stored on the device and the positive diagnosis list, the user 
may be notified and advised on steps to take next.’6 
The NHS Covid-19 app also offers additional features, including venue check-in functionality via QR 
codes; a symptom reporting tool; the means to order a test and receive the results; a countdown timer 
for self-isolation; and a means to communicate local authority advice and support information.7  
Digital proximity apps assist in the delivery of two types of intervention: (1) notifying symptomatic 
individuals to isolate; and (2) tracing the contacts of symptomatic cases and requiring these 
individuals to quarantine.8 These interventions aim to curtail the spread of the virus, by encouraging 
people to self-isolate when they exhibit symptoms or have been in contact with a person who tests 
positive for Covid-19. By aiming to contain the virus effectively, this approach should theoretically 
have a resultant positive effect on the wider population by avoiding the need for nationwide lockdowns. 
In addition, research has identified that the app has two ‘key value propositions’,9 the first being ‘a 
non-pharmaceutical intervention’ to the pandemic as discussed.10 The second is ‘as a data source’ to 
gather information in near-real time.11 As a result, the app was consciously designed to comply with 






4 See: https://github.com/CCTPS/UK/blob/master/Joint%20Statement.pdf 
5 Leo Kelion, BBC News, ‘UK virus-tracing app switches to Apple-Google model’, 18 June 2020. Available at: 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-53095336. 
6 Apple and Google, ‘Exposure Notifications Frequently Asked Questions’, September 2020. Available at: https://covid19-static.cdn-
apple.com/applications/covid19/current/static/contact-tracing/pdf/ExposureNotification-FAQv1.2.pdf. 
7 NHS Covid-19 App Support, ‘What the app does’. Available at: https://www.covid19.nhs.uk/what-the-app-does.html. 
8 Requirement to self-isolate is a legal requirement. See: https://faq.covid19.nhs.uk/article/KA-01146 
9 Interview with Data expert (‘D’) 11. 
10 Ibid. 




RISKS & CHALLENGES 
Stakeholders highlighted several risks and challenges in the development and deployment of the 
digital proximity app. The first challenge was proving the decentralised app has had a positive impact 
on public health. In this regard, our research found that the evaluation of the app ‘used causal 
inference mechanisms to establish a causal link between the app, impact, and its role as a non-
pharmaceutical intervention.’12 Stakeholders observed that the app began as an experiment, ‘a 
hypothesis that it could deliver impact.’ One year on, one interviewee claimed that the Government 
has ‘proved that now’.13 However, it has been argued that the application of the de-centralised model 
has limited the impact of the app, as officials cannot ‘observe the contact graph’ but must instead 
‘infer properties’ of said graph.14 Nonetheless, officials can still calculate how much ‘risky interaction 
is occurring’ denoted by an estimated ‘R’ number.15 In producing this estimate of the R number, the 
app can provide data 8-10 days ahead of the published R number because the data is produced in 
real-time.16 A paper examining the utility of 
digital proximity apps poses two questions that 
are in fact highly relevant to proving impact: (a) 
what data should be collected to fulfil the digital 
contact tracing functionality and (b) what data 
should be collected to gain epidemiological 
understanding of the spread of Covid-19?17  
In building the digital proximity app, one interviewee felt that the UK government was more interested 
in building a customer interface app than a tool which provides data to help our understanding of the 
spread of Covid-19.18 Notwithstanding the data that could have been gathered had a centralised 
version of the app been deployed, one interviewee stated that ‘the number one thing is you need 
public adoption’.19 Self-evidently, without public adoption, the app would be bound to fail. ‘Buy-in’ from 
the public is essential to have true impact. 
However, one stakeholder pointed out that ‘nobody [can] 
really know whether the apps have the intended outcome... 
unless you collect data around it you can't actually know 
whether it's appropriate intervention or not’.20 Indeed, 
simply having an app in operation could arguably lead to 
the unintentional creation of a ‘false sense of security’ within the population (i.e. the country has an 
 
12 Interview with D11. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. The contact graph refers to a graph that demonstrates where Covid-19 is being most spread, for example, the graph may indicate 
that supermarket X is where a large number of infections are taking place. Without this graph, officials must try to estimate where 
hotspots for spreading the virus take place. For example, there is a 40% chance that the virus is being spread at restaurants, and a 30% 
chance at gyms. 
15 The reproduction number, also known as the R number, quantifies how many people, on average, an infected person will pass the 
virus on to. An R value greater than 1 indicates an infected person will, on average, infect more than one other person while an R value 
below 1 suggests a slowdown of the spread of the virus. 
16 Interview with D11. 
17 Marcel Salathe and Ciro Cattuto, ‘COVID-19 Response: What Data is Necessary for Digital Proximity Tracing’, 10 April 2020.  
18 Interview with Academic (‘A’) 10. 
19 Interview with D13. There are approximately 20 million downloads of the NHS Covid-19 App. See: 
https://www.digitalhealth.net/2021/03/nhs-covid-19-app-important-pillar-in-easing-lockdown-restrictions/ 
20 Interview with A10.  
‘The first [centralised] version of the app is 
ethically more defensible than the current 
version because… unless you collect data 
around it you can’t actually know whether it’s an 
appropriate intervention or not.’ 
Stakeholder interview A10 
 
‘[The app] is not necessarily strictly 
about data but it is about the 
seductive nature of technology’. 





app so it must work).21 A false sense of security could lead to an over-reliance on technology to be 
infallible. Moreover, there is recent evidence to suggest that the public may in fact have been more 
accepting of privacy intrusive measures than anticipated (such as location tracking) in the interests of 
public health.22 An opportunity may therefore have been lost to implement a more effective public 
health intervention. However, additional safeguards may be required if a centralised approach were 
adopted, to ensure adequate checks and balances to prevent the unintended use of the data.  
An important challenge relates to the risks of excluding certain sections of society owing to a reliance 
on a technology solution. The UK Government’s evaluation of the ‘early adopter’ roll-out of the app in 
August 2020 found a ‘significant difference between the rates of download of white (51%) and BAME 
(33%) respondents.23 Furthermore, the Ada Lovelace Institute found that contact tracing apps and 
other data-driven tools have not benefited the whole of society owing to a digital divide.24 This 
encompasses issues such as lack of access to smartphones and broadband, poor digital skills and 
more general concerns over the app’s effectiveness. 
Cyber Risk 
A significant risk to the NHS Covid-19 app is from poor cyber security and cyber hygiene, an issue 
which in the initial stages of deployment was a central focus. For example, the centralised iteration of 
the app was tested on the Isle of Wight to assess this risk. Criminals sent fake SMS messages to 
people to steal personal data through a method called smishing (phishing through SMS).25 The texts 
informed recipients that they had come into contact with an individual who tested positive for Covid-
19 and asked them to go to a fake website to input personal details. Furthermore, security researchers 
found weaknesses in the app including in the sign-up process where attackers could steal encryption 
keys and prevent users from being notified when a contact had registered positive for Covid-19.26 
Whilst issues with the technology itself can always be patched, reliance on the digital literacy of users, 
particularly cyber hygiene, is a persistent risk with any technology, not only for public health driven 
solutions.  
 
21 Ibid.  
22 Stephan Lewandowsky et.al, ‘Public acceptance of privacy-encroaching policies to address the COVID-19 pandemic in the United 
Kingdom’, 22 January 2021, PLoS ONE, Vol. 16.  
23 Department of Health and Social Care, ‘NHS COVID-19 app: early adopter evaluation report: NHS Test and Trace programme’, 8 April 
2021, p.15. The data collected as part of the early adopter evaluation report uses the term BAME to measure downloads. A more 
nuanced approach from the Government would have broken down BAME into separate ethnic groupings to provide more granular data. 
The data collection as it stands does not account for cultural differences between these communities which may impact download and 
use of the Covid-19 app.  
24 Ada Lovelace Institute, ‘The Data Divide: Public attitudes to tackling social and health inequalities in the COVID-19 pandemic and 
beyond’, March 2021.  
25 Alex Scroxton, ComputerWeekly, ‘UK’s contact-tracing app targeted by scammers’, 14 May 2020. Available at: 
https://www.computerweekly.com/news/252483125/UKs-contact-tracing-app-targeted-by-scammers 





LAW, REGULATION & GOVERNANCE 
The NHS Covid-19 app is subject to domestic data protection and 
privacy laws of the GDPR and Data Protection Act 2018, together with 
human rights protections afforded by the Human Rights Act 1998 and 
applicable international human rights instruments. The Health 
Secretary has issued legal notices under the National Health Service 
Act 2006 requiring NHS Digital, NHS England, and others to share and 
process confidential health information under the Health Services 
(Control of Patient Information) Regulations 2002.27  
Privacy and Data Protection  
The NHS Covid-19 app has been designed to preserve the user’s 
privacy. No personal data is recorded on the app itself when the app 
is downloaded or when a user informs the app that they have tested 
positive for Covid-19. No personal data can be accessed by the app 
from the smartphone. Since the app works by exchanging randomly 
generated codes, no personal or private information is shared with 
other users. In order for the app to notify the user as to whether their 
local area becomes high risk the first characters of the postcode are 
required. It is not possible, however, to identify the individual user from 
these characters. 
Medical Law and Ethics  
Section 2A of the NHS Act 2006 forms the legal basis for the provision of the NHS test and trace 
service and subsequent NHS Covid-19 app.28 This section imposes a statutory duty on the Secretary 
of State for Health and Social Care to take such steps as are appropriate to protect the public from 
disease or dangers to health, which would include mobile digital proximity applications for monitoring 
and tracing the spread of Covid-19.  
Ethical debates concerning the use of the NHS Covid-19 app have centred on: 
• the app’s efficacy (given its effectiveness depends on a high degree of uptake by the public);  
• digital poverty and the risk that the use of technology might exacerbate existing health 
inequalities amongst already disadvantaged groups;  
• the extent to which the app provides anonymity and security of personal data; 
• issues regarding misinformation and understanding; 
• the public’s willingness to trust that their potentially sensitive data will not fall into the hands of 
public and private bodies, governmental agencies (police, immigration services, local 
authorities etc), third sector organisations. 
 
27 NHS Digital, ‘Control of patient information (COPI) notice’, https://digital.nhs.uk/coronavirus/coronavirus-covid-19-response-information-
governance-hub/control-of-patient-information-copi-notice 
28 National Health Service Act 2006. See: https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/41/contents 
Data Protection 
The Data Protection Act 
2018 and UK GDPR apply 
where an organisation 
processes (collects, stores, 
shares etc) personal data 
(information that relates to 
an identified or identifiable 
living person – Art. 4). The 
legislation will apply where 
data may be used to identify 
an individual directly or in 
combination with other 
information, using all 
reasonable means possible. 
Examples of identifiers 
include: name, location 
data, online identifiers such 
as IP address. The use of 
‘special category data’ 
(including data concerning 
health, race or ethnic origin) 
imposes additional, more 





An ethics advisory board (EAB) chaired by Sir Jonathan Montgomery was established to provide 
‘constructive challenge to, and independent scrutiny of’ initial proposals to develop an NHS Covid-19 
app in May 2020.29 The EAB published its proposed ethical framework for a digital proximity app and 
published a draft report on 25 August 2020 setting out 6 guiding principles (value, impact, security 
and privacy, accountability, transparency, and control).30 The ethical framework devised by the EAB 
remains pertinent to the subsequent development of the NHS Covid-19 app in September 2020.31 
Software used for medical purposes must be either CE, CE United Kingdom Northern Ireland (UKNI) 
or UK Conformity Assessed (UKCA) marked to conform to regulatory standards, and is fit for intended 
purposes, and meets safety legislation.32 These directives are given effect in UK law through the 
Medical Devices Regulations 2002 (SI 2002 No 618, as amended) (UK MDR 2002). The MHRA 
(Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency) is responsible for market surveillance of 
medical devices in the UK market and takes decisions on marketing and supply of devices within this 
jurisdiction. The trial of the app during August 2020 in the Isle of Wight was approved by the MHRA33 
and the app itself is a registered Class-1 medical device and has received a UKCA mark following 






29 Andrea Downey, DigitalHealth, ‘NHSX sets up ethics advisory board to oversee contact-tracing app’, 27 April 2020. Available at: 
https://www.digitalhealth.net/2020/04/nhsx-sets-up-ethics-advisory-board-to-oversea-contact-tracing-app/ 
30 Report on the work of the Ethics Advisory Group to NHSx on the COVID-19 Contact Tracing App. Available at: 
https://covid19.nhs.uk/pdf/ethic-advisory-group-report.pdf 
31 See also international projects on the ethics and governance of digital contact tracing such as Kahn, Jeffrey and Johns Hopkins Project 
on Ethics and Governance of Digital Contact Tracing Technologies, ‘Digital Contact Tracing for Pandemic Response: Ethics and 
Governance Guidance’, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2020.  
32 Directive 93/42/EEC on medical devices (EU MDD). 
33 See: https://faq.covid19.nhs.uk/article/KA-01111/en-us 
34 Apple Store, ‘NHS COVID-19’, https://apps.apple.com/kh/app/nhs-covid-19/id1520427663 
LESSONS LEARNED 
• Managing the public's attitude to privacy and gathering useful data to inform policy decisions 
is a difficult balance to strike. The consequences of a decentralised approach to digital 
contact tracing should be further evaluated. 
• Cyber security risks are a concern and therefore any technological solution requires trust 
in the technology provider and an awareness of cyber literacy in the user, which is typically 
low.  
• The number of downloads across different groups of people varied significantly. Individuals 





CASE STUDY 2  








• Our research uncovered concerns that using risk scoring algorithms to inform public health 
policymaking is not always a reliable method of quantifying risk in individuals.  
• The QCovid algorithm, used in the UK to identify people at high risk of being hospitalised or 
dying of Covid-19, has helped to provide a data-driven approach to public health policy. 
However, questions remain about the extent to which the patient should be involved in this 
process, to provide consent. 
CASE STUDY OVERVIEW 
This case study examines the QCovid risk scoring algorithm, used to identify vulnerable people at 
high risk of being hospitalised and dying from Covid-19. The QCovid algorithm was used in England 
to inform public policy decisions by identifying those who needed to shield (i.e. reduce all contact with 
others and self-isolate throughout the pandemic) and those most in need of the vaccine. 
AIMS, OBJECTIVES & BENEFITS 
The QCovid algorithm aims to minimise death and severe illness from Covid-19 by protecting the 
vulnerable, or those most in need of vaccination. It achieves this by identifying the most at-risk groups 
within the population. The QCovid algorithm is an ‘evidence-based risk prediction model that 
estimates’ the risk of admission to hospital or death from Covid-19.35 The algorithm is used to support 
the risk prioritisation of people who should shield and those most clinically in need of the vaccine. 
The primary use of QCovid to inform public health policy is ‘the prevention of COVID-19 mortality and 
the protection of health and social care staff and systems’.36 Advice on vaccine prioritisation has been 
developed based on evidence drawn from various UK epidemiological data.37 QCovid is an important 
contributor to these data sources. The QCovid algorithm is also used by local authorities to cross 
check adult social care records.38 This helps local authorities to identify those who need to shield and 
ensure they are supported.39 The principal benefit of using the QCovid algorithm is to apply a more 
data driven approach to safeguarding the most vulnerable in society, potentially identifying individuals 
who may go unnoticed by manual, non-algorithmic risk assessment methods. The QCovid algorithm 
informs the COVID-19 Clinical Risk Assessment Tool.40
 
35 See: https://qcovid.org/Home/Algorithm 




38 Interview with Government representative (‘G’) 7. 
39 See Snapshot Report 1, Data-Driven Approaches to Public Policy. 




Parameters and Statistical Validity 
Through the combination of various characteristics (age, ethnicity, BMI as well as a number of 
comorbidities), QCovid estimates the risks of hospitalisation and mortality from Covid-19 in adults.41   
Models were constructed to establish mathematical relationships between the outcomes of interest 
(the two considered in QCovid are the primary outcome of death from Covid-19 and the secondary 
outcome of time to hospital admission with confirmed Covid-19 infection) and the risk factors. Models 
were developed separately for men and women. 
The dataset consisted of ‘national linked datasets from general practice and national SARS-CoV-2 
testing, death registry, and hospital episode data for a sample of more than 8 million adults 
representative of the population of England.’42 In developing and validating the algorithm, the entire 
dataset was split into two, the training set and the test set. Model development (involving parameter 
estimation and variable selection to identify the important risk factors) was carried out using the 
training data. To examine the predictive performance, risk predictions were made using the resulting 
models and the model predictions were then compared against the outcomes in the test set. The 
performance of the QCovid algorithm was externally validated by the Office of National Statistics.43 
RISKS & CHALLENGES 
One of the key challenges presented by the QCovid algorithm, or indeed any algorithmically informed 
decision-making tool, is the use of outdated or unreliable health data to inform risk stratification. This 
may, for example, result in an individual being 
classified as high risk and thus directed to shield on the 
basis of a past health issue. Similarly, this issue could 
enable individuals who are not ‘high-risk’ to receive a 
vaccine earlier than those who are clinically vulnerable. 
In the case of missing data, one interviewee observed 
that a precautionary approach had been applied, 
resolving any omissions with data that indicates a high 
risk in the interests of safety.44  
A further risk highlighted by interviewees focused largely on uncertainties around using algorithmic 
tools to inform wider policymaking, as opposed to the QCovid algorithm specifically. Generally, 
stakeholders were concerned about the ’black box’ effect of algorithmic tools: ‘the fact that you don’t 
know how it is making [the decision], what is driving the decision between the inputs and outputs’.45 
This lack of transparency can also have an impact upon accountability for those decisions. Another 
interviewee stated that ‘this is not weather forecasting, it’s modelling for illustration, modelling for 
 
41 Clift A K, Coupland C A C, Keogh R H, Diaz-Ordaz K, Williamson E, Harrison E M et al. ‘Living risk prediction algorithm (QCOVID) for 
risk of hospital admission and mortality from coronavirus 19 in adults: national derivation and validation cohort study’, BMJ 2020, 
doi:10.1136/bmj.m3731 
42 Ibid. 
43 Vahe Nafilyan, et.al, ‘An external validation of the QCovid risk prediction algorithm for risk of mortality from COVID-19 in adults; national 
validation cohort study in England’, 22 January 2021. 
44 Interview with A10. 
45 Interview with D12. This comment was made in the context of wider risk scoring algorithms that use machine learning, not the QCovid 
model which was publicly validated by the Office of National Statistics.  
‘To train a good machine learning 
algorithm you need lots of data and so 
we have places within the health system 
that will naturally have large quantities of 
data, but that doesn’t necessarily mean it 
is clean data or well labelled data. And 
then when you use that data to train, you 
inherit both all of its clinical utility and the 
faults. 




building understanding, modelling for storytelling and that is it.’46 In other words, mathematical 
modelling is not used for the purpose of finding the answer, it is for providing the path to an answer. 
On the other hand, one stakeholder highlighted the ‘risk of being forced to use modelling beyond its 
power because politicians are under pressure and need something to help’.47 Exacerbating this issue, 
according to one interviewee, is ‘misinformation’48 – the risk of ‘people just grabbing numbers out 
there’ and misinterpreting the data, leading to tenuous conclusions.49 Furthermore, algorithms can 
develop ‘spurious correlations’.50 For instance, one interviewee stated that an algorithm using chest 
x-rays to detect Covid-19 in patients determined that patients were more likely to be seriously ill or 
die if they were lying down when the x-ray was taken.51 
LAW, REGULATION & GOVERNANCE 
The key legal frameworks in relation to the QCovid algorithm are the UK GDPR and Data Protection 
Act 2018. Again, domestic common law principles of consent and confidentiality also apply to the 
sharing of confidential medical data, together with European and international human rights laws 
where applicable. 
Privacy & Data Protection  
To use the QCovid app, the clinician must be connected to the Health and Social Care Network. When 
the app is used by a clinician, the clinician enters information about an individual’s age, sex, ethnicity, 
height, weight, postcode, and medical history to determine an individual’s risk of being hospitalised 
or dying from Covid-19. 
The data protection impact assessment provided in relation to the NHS Digital Covid-19 Clinical Risk 
Assessment Tool states that no personal data is processed by the Tool. The clinician entering data 
will, however, process personal data (information relating to and from which an individual may be 
identified) when they review a patient’s health record or seek and record information about a patient 
in such records. Personal data use is governed by the data protection regime.52 NHS Digital confirms 
that organisations/clinicians using QCovid must have a data protection impact assessment in place 
together with a privacy notice informing patients how their personal data is going to be used in relation 
to the QCovid algorithm (in order to comply with obligations as to fair and transparent processing of 
data).53 Since personal data relating to ethnicity and health data is classified as ‘special category’ 
personal data, the clinician’s processing of the data in the patient’s health record (retrieval and review) 
must be justified.  
  
 
46 Interview with D9.  
47 Ibid.  
48Interview with Regulator (‘R’) 5.  
49 Ibid.  
50 Interview with D9. 
51 Ibid. Machine learning algorithms were developed to analyse chest x-rays to determine disease severity and likelihood of progression in 
patients. For more details see: https://www.thelancet.com/journals/landig/article/PIIS2589-7500(21)00039-X/fulltext  
52 UK GDPR and Data Protection Act 2018. 





Human Rights  
Article 8 ECHR (Z v Finland (1988) 25 EHRR 371) covers information which individuals can 
legitimately expect not to be gathered, published, stored, or used without their consent, including 
medical data. Article 8 is a qualified right, however. This means that interferences with the right are 
permissible where in accordance with the law and necessary in a democratic society to achieve such 
aims as the protection of health or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others (of relevance 
here). Given that personal information is not provided, that it is envisaged that data will often be input 
by a clinician in the presence of the patient, with their knowledge and consent, it could be argued that 
the tool is a proportionate response to the aim of protecting health. 
 Medical Law and Ethics  
Where individuals have been identified by the Covid-19 Clinical Risk Assessment Tool as clinically 
extremely vulnerable, they are encouraged to shield. This direction amounts to advice only and 
individuals have the right to choose whether to follow that advice in line with established legal 
principles of personal autonomy and self-determination.54 Should they choose to ignore the advice to 
shield, they must nevertheless follow any Covid-19 Government restrictions that are currently in place. 
It is envisaged that medical decisions relating to the QCovid score must be taken by a patient in 
consultation with their doctor.55 The risk assessment tool ‘therefore supplements clinical decision 
making and does not replace it’.56 The Covid-19 Clinical Risk Assessment Tool obtains information 
with consent from 1) clinicians entering patient information and 2) existing medical records. For 
consent to be valid, it must be given voluntarily by a person who has capacity to consent and who 
understands the nature of the proposed intervention and risks involved. Information relating to medical 
treatment is subject to a duty of confidence although it is assumed that information is shared with the 
knowledge and consent of the patient and no personally identifiable information is retained by the 
tool.  
There will be some clinically extremely vulnerable people who have conditions, such as dementia or 
learning disabilities, which impact upon their ability to make informed decisions about Covid-19 risks 
and whether to shield. Their capacity to make this decision should be assessed in accordance with 
the Mental Capacity Act 2005 in England and Wales (with similar laws operating in Scotland and 
Northern Ireland). ‘Best-interests’ decisions will be made for people who are assessed to lack capacity 
based on clinical advice, involving the person as much as possible, ascertaining the views of 
significant others and attorneys, and with regard to the person’s past and present wishes.  
 
54 See FAQs letter to GPs on risk tool, 15 February 2021. Available at: https://www.england.nhs.uk/coronavirus/wp-
content/uploads/sites/52/2020/03/C1099_-Letter-to-GPs-on-Risk-Tool-15-February.pdf 
55 See QCovid licence: https://qcovid.org 






• It is important to ensure that transparency around the use of algorithms is sufficient 
with appropriate validation. 
• Where the reliability of data in an algorithm is low, there is a risk of ‘spurious 
correlations’ being made.  
• Public health emergencies may justify the deployment of an algorithm that makes (false 
positive) errors owing to a precautionary approach. However, attention must be paid to 













• A digital Covid-status certification scheme faces significant implementation challenges. 
Stakeholders raised concerns around the timeliness and purpose of certification, the right 
to privacy, and security risks that could arise. The probabilistic and contextual nature of 
certification is not well known or understood. 
• A certification scheme could adversely impact those who demonstrate vaccine hesitancy, 
particularly from ethnic minority communities. Considerable concerns were raised in our 
research over certification becoming a surrogate for discrimination. 
CASE STUDY OVERVIEW 
This case study explores the proposed digital ‘passport’ or ‘certificate’ to communicate a person’s full 
vaccination status and/or their ability to transmit Covid-19 to others based on the current vaccine roll-
out in the UK. The ‘passport’ or ‘certificate’ may enable travel across borders and potentially entry to 
domestic venues such as bars and restaurants. The validity of Covid-status certificates has been 
called into question given the lack of scientific data regarding the long-term immunity from Covid-19 
provided by vaccination or previous infection. 
AIMS, OBJECTIVES & BENEFITS 
The aim of a digital Covid-status certificate is to aid the return to pre-Covid-19 activities and travel 
without compromising personal or public health. A Covid-status certificate aims to achieve this 
objective by certifying that holders are protected from the virus, allowing them to carry out the activities 
for which the certificate is needed and avoid additional burdens on health services. This assumes that 
an individual cannot become infectious and transmit Covid-19 to others. At the time of writing, the UK 
government has indicated an intention to incorporate a certificate into the NHS app specifically for 
travelling abroad.57  
A Covid-status certification scheme is a method of identifying which individuals have 1) had the full 
vaccination; 2) a recent negative Covid-19 test; or 3) antibodies (in some proposals). Each of these 
types of evidence presents its own strengths and weaknesses: 
1) Full vaccination: While the benefits of being vaccinated for the individual are clear (i.e. a 
significantly reduced risk of severe illness or hospitalisation), it is less clear how a vaccination 
affects an individual’s infectiousness, and thus their ability to transmit Covid-19 to others. 
Additionally, different vaccines may potentially offer different levels of effectiveness to the 
 




various genetic variants of the virus, and there is a significant number of individuals who are 
not yet eligible for vaccination.  
2) Negative Covid-19 test: A recent negative Covid-19 test result, on the other hand, may be 
more widely available, but does not protect the tested individual from infection. In addition, test 
results can vary in accuracy and implications. For example, there are ‘red light’ tests which 
indicate a person is potentially infectious and ‘green light’ tests where a negative result means 
the person is not infectious. As a result, the type of test will likely need to be considered. 
Relatedly there is a concern that more expensive tests can lead to more accurate results, with 
implications for fair access to certification. Furthermore, a negative test result only captures 
data for one given point in time and does not guarantee that the person will not catch Covid-
19 after the test is taken. 
3) Antibodies: A third type of evidence that is being considered is the presence of antibodies 
arising from a previous Covid-19 infection. This would mean that people who have already 
contracted and recovered from Covid-19 may benefit from greater societal privileges. 
However, there is currently no evidence that indviduals who have recovered from Covid-19 
and have antibodies are protected from a second infection, or new variants of the virus. 
At the time of writing, the benefits of certification are not fully realised. A certification framework that 
indicates test results may be beneficial for those who had not yet received the vaccine or who choose 
not to vaccinate. More broadly, a certification framework could assist in opening up the economy and 
preventing future restrictions on domestic travel. International travel could resume to countries without 
the need to quarantine on departure or arrival. Another benefit of the certification identified by 
stakeholders was the re-opening of large venues to enable gatherings for sport or music.58 In this 
regard, one interviewee opined that because these venues are not obligatory to attend, the certificate 
would not be unreasonable to request.59 
Parameters and Statistical Validity 
The confidence in a digital ‘passport’ or ‘certification’ hinges on the efficacy of vaccinations and the 
accuracy of test results. The Royal Society highlighted 12 challenges for vaccine passports in 
February 2021, stating that ‘A Covid-19 vaccine passport is feasible but not all the pieces are in place 
to allow one to be effectively delivered yet’.60 There is currently a need for more information on the 
efficacy of vaccines in preventing infection and transmission by the currently circulating viruses, 
including genetic variants and the duration of protective immunity to establish how long a certificate 
might be valid.  
Tests to measure Covid-19 antibodies in the blood can be a valuable tool to assess the prevalence 
and spread of the virus. But they vary widely in quality and efficacy. This has led the World Health 
Organisation and former US Food and Drug Administration commissioner Scott Gottlieb to caution 
against their use in assessing individual health or immunity status.61 Several available tests are 
 
58 Interview with A8. 
59 Ibid.  
60 The Royal Society, ’12 Challenges for Vaccine Passports’, 19 February 2021. Available at: https://royalsociety.org/news/2021/02/12-
challenges-for-vaccine-passports/. 





sufficiently accurate, meaning they are validated to have at least 99% specificity and sensitivity. But 
preliminary data suggests that the vast majority are not reliable. Low specificity means the test 
measures antibodies other than those that are specific to Covid-19. This causes false positives, 
leading people to think they are immune when they are not. Low sensitivity means that the test 
requires a person to have a high concentration of Covid-19 antibodies for them to be measured 
effectively. This causes false negatives in people who have few antibodies, leading to potentially 
immune individuals being incorrectly classified as not immune. 
Research found that most recovered patients produce antibodies for Covid-19.62 However, 
uncertainties remain around how effective antibodies are for future strains or how long immunity lasts. 
Currently, estimates are based on prior knowledge of immunity in severe acute respiratory syndrome 
(SARS) and Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS). The best guess is therefore one to two years 
of protection.63 However, if Covid-19 mimics the common cold the timeline for immunity could be much 
lower. This lack of data on immunity could impair the relevance or impact of a Covid-status certificate 
for domestic or international use. 
RISKS & CHALLENGES 
Our stakeholders raised several significant risks and challenges to implementing Covid-status 
certifications. One stakeholder outlined that the certification ‘takes information at a point of time, a test 
result and their origin body result which has… all of these probabilities. You would then interpret those 
probabilities with lots of other information and give a piece of advice that says no I don’t think you 
should go here because I think that you’re a bit higher risk than usual or you might be presenting risks 
to others.’64 In essence, the certificate attempts to take a number of variables and reduce the 
probabilities involved to assign people into one of two categories in order to determine if a person is 
infectious or not. This can be misleading because, as the stakeholder surmised, ‘clinically this is much 
more probabilistic and much more contextual.’65  
At the time of writing the UK has announced a Covid-status certificate will be available in electronic 
format through the NHS app.66 However, there are significant practical challenges facing the 
implementation of the certificate. As Chris Green MP raised in a House of Commons debate on 
vaccination passports, ‘If we moved from paper certificates to electronic, however, significant 
questions of civil liberty would arise. Who in the world would run that database? What data would go 
into it and who would determine that? Would it be an international body such as the United Nations, 
the EU or some other organisation? If we could not get an international organisation to take the lead, 
would a big corporate organisation do so? Would big tech in California have control over the 
database? In the light of what happened when the Australian national Government confronted a big 
 
62 Ania Wajnberg, et.al, ‘Humoral immune response and prolonged PCR positivity in a cohort of 1343 SARS-CoV2 patients in the New 
York City region’, medRxiv, May 2020. 
63 Natalie Kofler and Francoise Baylis, Nature, ‘Ten reasons why immunity passports are a bad idea’, 21 May 2020. Available at: 
https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-01451-0#ref-CR3 
64 Interview with A8.  
65 Ibid. 





tech company, giving such a company so much power would be a colossal problem. We need to be 
proportionate and cautious.’67  
In our stakeholder interviews, experts were most concerned about the prospect of certification 
becoming a ‘surrogate for discrimination’.68 Stakeholders raised the concern that if workplaces were 
to request vaccine certification to either get a job or return to the workplace, this could lead to ‘indirect 
discrimination’.69 Furthermore, according to one interviewee there are remaining questions around 
how much the process will be outsourced to the private sector, without being guided by human rights 
obligations.70 This was mirrored in a report by Ada Lovelace outlining six requirements for 
governments issuing a vaccine passport system. ‘Ethical consideration and clear legal guidance about 
permitted and restricted uses, and mechanisms to support rights and redress and tackle illegal use’ 
is a requirement that links directly with our stakeholders’ concerns.71 
Our research has also found that ‘coercion by the backdoor’ is a key concern with regard to 
certification for people of all ages, regardless of how quickly certain age groups are vaccinated.72 
Concerns were raised about the application of certificates without scrutiny, as well as what can be 
perceived as an ‘unjustified intrusion’ on an individual’s personal choice with regard to vaccination.73 
By revealing the status of vaccination an individual’s ‘medical status becomes publicly interrogable’.74 
One interviewee argued that certification will effectively result in a two-tiered society whereby 
vaccinated people are treated differently from those who have not been vaccinated.75 
Stakeholders also questioned whether the implementation of the Covid-status certification would 
logistically deliver its intended outcome in view of the planned timeline for vaccination of the 
population: ‘The window in which [vaccine passports] are useful is really quite narrow because once 
everybody is vaccinated you don't really need to differentiate. The community is reasonably safe and 
so why would you exclude some people? … it's only really useful when you have a sufficient number 
of people vaccinated that enables you to open things up, but you don't have everybody vaccinated, 
so you can open them up to everybody.’76 The value of a vaccine certificate scheme is therefore 
‘transitional’.77 This stakeholder estimated, based on the current vaccination delivery plan, that it is 
very unlikely that families with children will have been fully vaccinated by the summer holidays in 
2021: ‘There's a window of opportunity and it doesn't seem to fit what we need. We need something 
for this summer now. … what is the practical benefit of this?’78 Relatedly, it was pointed out that for 
many businesses it will not be commercially sensible to operate a Covid-status certificate scheme, 
given that a large proportion of their potential customers will not have been vaccinated. There appears 
 




68 Interview with A4. 
69 Ibid.  
70 Ibid.  
71 Ada Lovelace Institute, ‘Checkpoints for vaccine passports’, 10 May 2021, https://www.adalovelaceinstitute.org/report/checkpoints-
vaccine-passports/ 










to be a ‘mismatch between the rhetoric of what [vaccine passports] are about and what they would do 
for society’ and as this stakeholder fundamentally observed ‘it is not obvious what problem is solved 
by this certification’.79  
Furthermore, there is an inherent cyber risk in using Covid-status certificates. Questions remain about 
whether they could be duplicated, corrupted, or destroyed without the permission of the certificate 
owner. In Israel, several flaws were found in the app including the ability to be duplicated and therefore 
sell fake certificates online.80 The Economist pointed out that ‘security is a good place to start, for if 
passports are to work, they must be trustworthy.’81 If trust in the scheme is compromised, it could lead 
to further distrust of other government backed technologies to tackle the pandemic or relating to 
healthcare more widely. 
LAW, REGULATION & GOVERNANCE 
As in the above case studies the UK’s GDPR is the primary data protection framework governing the 
use of individuals’ data. In addition to the privacy and data protection implications, this section focuses 
on the ethical considerations around discriminatory implementation of any certification scheme.  
Privacy and Data Protection  
Covid-status certificates may contain personal, private, health-related information (Covid-19 
vaccination, Covid-19 antibodies, negative test for Covid-19). They will therefore contain ‘special 
category’ personal data and be covered by the UK GDPR and Data Protection Act 2018. Processing 
of such data is possible where justified, as necessary.82 If an individual is unable to travel freely, enter 
or access certain premises unless they consent to inclusion of their personal data then such consent 
is not freely given.  
If Covid-status certificates are used for domestic purposes, then organisations must consider carefully 
how they can justify asking someone to produce a certificate and what the legal basis is for asking to 
view a certificate. Businesses are likely to have to consider an alternative legal basis, such as 
processing on the basis of substantial public interest.83  Businesses must also consider how they will 
satisfy the stringent security requirements that apply to the collection and storage of such data. Ideally 
any business seeking to rely upon Covid-status certificates should carry out a data protection impact 
assessment. 
The requirement for someone to disclose their health status in order to travel or to access services 
engages their rights under the Article 8 ECHR right to private life. Article 8 covers information which 
individuals can legitimately expect not to be gathered, published, stored, or used without their consent, 
including medical data.84 Article 8 is a qualified right, but any interference with the right (i.e. a 
 
79 Ibid. 
80 Toi Staff, The Times of Israel, ‘Thousands reportedly attempt to obtain easily forged vaccinated certificate’, 18 February 2021. Available 
at: https://www.timesofisrael.com/thousands-reportedly-attempt-to-obtain-easily-forged-vaccinated-certificate/ 
81 The Economist, ‘Are vaccine passports a good idea?’, March 13 2021. Available at: https://www.economist.com/science-and-
technology/2021/03/13/are-vaccine-passports-a-good-idea 
82 The justifications in Article 6/Section 8 DPA 2018 apply to personal data, and additional justifications under Article 9 UKGDPR and Part 
2 of Schedule 1 DPA 2018 must be demonstrated for special category personal data. 
83 Of the Part 2 Schedule 1 DPA 2018 list of 23 substantial public interest conditions which might be considered only two appear relevant: 
safeguarding of individuals at risk and safeguarding of economic well-being. 




requirement to disclose one’s Covid status) must be in accordance with the law and necessary in a 
democratic society to achieve such aims as the protection of health or the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others. 
Medical Law and Ethics  
Ethical concerns surrounding Covid-status certificates include the potential for discrimination (direct 
and indirect) and the worsening of existing inequalities. Mandating certificates would unfairly exclude 
those who do not have access to vaccines. The World Health Organisation is currently advising 
against the introduction of certificates by national authorities and 
conveyance operators on scientific and equality grounds.85 ‘The 
disparate timing in vaccine roll-out, compounded by some high-
income countries signing advance purchase agreements with 
vaccine companies, creates a segregated society or world into 
the ‘vaccine-privileged’ versus ‘vaccine-deprived’.’86   
Vaccinations are being offered to older people and other 
vulnerable adults, some of whom may have impaired capacity to 
consent to vaccinations and for whom best-interests decisions 
need to be made. Adults with the capacity to decide whether to 
be vaccinated (as well as those making best interest decisions 
on behalf of incapacitated adults) may feel coerced into 
consenting to vaccinations as without a Covid-status certificate 
they will potentially be denied access to certain services, jobs, 
and foreign travel, for example. This risk may be especially 
pertinent amongst people of certain ethnic minority groups 
exhibiting vaccine hesitancy, people with conscientious 
objections, people from socioeconomic backgrounds with a 
historical mistrust of medical health systems, and those with 
specific health status/conditions. 
The need to comply with equality and discrimination laws, which 
in the UK are now principally found in the Equality Act 2010, 
means that some people may be exempt from having to receive vaccinations (protected 
religious/philosophical beliefs or due to underlying health/disability grounds) and holding certificates. 
A burden is being placed on frontline workers to police the regulation of certificates without appropriate 
tools. Certain sectors of society who may not have access to digital smartphones to access the 
certificate would be excluded from services, exacerbating the digital divide for the elderly or those 
without digital devices.87  
 
85 World Health Organization, ‘Interim position paper: considerations regarding proof of COVID-19 vaccination for international travellers’, 
5 February 2021. Available at: https://www.who.int/news-room/articles-detail/interim-position-paper-considerations-regarding-proof-of-
covid-19-vaccination-for-international-travellers 
86 Lawrence O. Gostin et.al, ‘Digital Health Passes in the Age of COVID-19: Are “Vaccine Passports” Lawful and Ethical?’, JAMA, April 7 
2021.  
87 The Royal Society, ’12 Challenges for Vaccine Passports’, 19 February 2021. Available at: https://royalsociety.org/news/2021/02/12-
challenges-for-vaccine-passports/. 
Equality 
The Equality Act 2010 sets out the 
public sector equality duty (s.149) 
which requires, amongst other 
things, that public authorities have 
due regard to the need to advance 
equality of opportunity between 
people who share a protected 
characteristic and those who do 
not. The protected characteristics 
(s.4) are: age; disability; gender 
reassignment; pregnancy or 
maternity; being married or in a 
civil partnership; race; religion or 
belief; sex; or sexual orientation. In 
particular, in relation to people with 
protected characteristics, public 
authorities must take steps to 
remove or minimise disadvantage; 
meet the specific needs where 
they differ from the needs of other 
people; and encourage 
participation in public life/activities 
where participation is 
disproportionately low. The Act 
also prohibits direct and indirect 
discrimination by providers of 





The Equality Act 2010 also bans indirect discrimination. Indirect 
discrimination might occur where: 
• A business denies entry to their premises or denies a service to 
someone because they do not have a Covid-status certificate. 
• The rule impacts disproportionally on people with a protected 
characteristic such as age; disability; ethnicity. 
Human Rights 
One argument for certificates is that they enable individuals to 
move freely in public (exercising their Article 11 ECHR right to 
freedom of assembly and association) whilst at the same time 
protecting health and preventing loss of life (Article 2 ECHR) by 
limiting unfettered movement without mask or other restrictions to 
those who can evidence that they are unlikely to pose a risk to 
others. If Covid-status certificates are used to limit individuals’ 
ability to exercise their Article 11 ECHR right to freedom of 
assembly and association then consideration needs to be given to 
ensuring that the practical operation of certificates does not 
discriminate against particular groups. Article 14 ECHR makes 
clear that the enjoyment of all ECHR rights must be afforded, 
without discrimination on any grounds, including grounds of sex, 
religion, colour, language, religion, national or social origin, 
association with a national minority, property, birth, or other status. 
Issues are potentially posed for elderly adults who do not own 
smartphones or related technology. 
None of the current debates about Covid-status certificates consider the child’s perspective. 
Significant reports bring together numerous academics, none of whom are experts on children’s 
rights.88 The benefits of Covid-status certificates for children are the same as adults. But there are 
currently no plans to offer vaccinations to children under 16 years old. Certificates linked to a previous 
positive test will be relevant only to a limited number of children (reports suggest 20-35% of children 
with Covid-19 are asymptomatic). Governments do not currently appear to be considering how 
certificates can be applied to children or seeking children’s views in this regard despite requirements 
under the UNCRC for public bodies to treat the child’s interests as a primary consideration in all 
actions undertaken by them (Article 3) and the Article 12 UNCRC requirements to afford capable 





88 Ada Lovelace Institute, ‘What place should COVID-19 vaccine passports have in society?’, 17 February 2021.  
Human rights 
Article 8 of the European 
Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms 
(ECHR) affords a right to 
respect for private life. Art. 8 
covers information which 
individuals can legitimately 
expect not to be gathered, 
published, stored or used 
without their consent, including 
medical data (Z v Finland 
(1988) 25 EHRR 371); and 
personal data more generally 
(Satakunnan Markinaporssi Oy 
and Satamedia Oy v Finland 
App no 931/13). Art. 8 is a 
qualified right with which the 
state may interfere in certain 
circumstances where 
necessary in a democratic 
society and in accordance with 
the law. This includes in the 
interests of public safety, the 
protection of health or morals, 
and for the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others. 
The requirement that 
interference is necessary 
entails a test of proportionality; 
interference must be no more 
than necessary to meet the 










• The risk of coercion by the backdoor and the impact of potential discrimination from certification should 
be mitigated by communicating a clear purpose for certification and implementing rules 
specifying permitted use. A monitoring and oversight mechanism should be implemented to prevent 
misuse of the certification scheme. 
• The probabilistic, contextual, and time-limited nature of certification needs to be better understood 
and communicated to individuals. 
• The wider human rights implications of certification should be front and centre of the debate without 
excluding the voice of children. 
